Research

Reducing Grading Discrimination with Blind Grading and a Pay-for-Accuracy Mechanism (Job Market Paper)

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Abstract

Can blind grading reduce grading discrimination? To answer this question, I use an online laboratory experiment to explore whether grading subjective material, like essays, in a blind or non-blind grading environment can result in differences in grading behaviors and whether financially incentivizing accuracy---the pay-for-accuracy mechanism---can reduce those differences. Results suggest that observing salient signals of students’ identities may lead to biases in grades, though order effects and financial incentives may dampen those biases. By design, the experiment emulates the grading environment found in common digital learning platforms. Schools that use digital learning platforms may want to utilize pay-for-accuracy mechanisms and their digital platform's blind grading feature to reduce the potential for grading discrimination.

Distributional Effects of Gun Control Laws (with Garrett Stanford) 

In November, Oregon narrowly passed a measure that restricts the possession of firearms, reflecting a national push for stricter gun control. The new law charges the Oregon State Police (OSP) with issuing permits to lawfully own a firearm and allows the OSP discretion when deciding to issue a permit. While proponents of the law have lauded the discretionary power, opponents are concerned that designating an institution that potentially struggles with biased practices as an important gatekeeper could have unintended impacts. We use a field experiment to test for the presence of racial discrimination concerning firearm ownership.

Research in Progress 

Experimental Evidence of Blind Grading in the Classroom (with Mike Kofoed)